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Abstract
Protection of privacy in databases has become of increasing importance. While
a number of techniques have been proposed to query databases while preserving privacy of individual records in the database, very little is done to define a measure on
how much privacy is lost after statistical releases. We suggest a definition based on
information theory. Intuitively, the privacy loss is proportional to how much the descriptional complexity of a record decreases relative to the statistical release. There
are some problems with this basic definition and we suggest ways to address these
problems.
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Introduction

The earliest article we know that refers to privacy is an 1890 Harvard Law Review article entitled “The Right to Privacy”, by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren [9]. The
authors warned that technological advances threatened our privacy. They were referring
to ‘instantaneous photographs’ and other ‘mechanical devices’. Over 100 years later, this
warning is even more relevant, although technological advances revolve around computers, sharing of information, and the internet. Data collection through surveys, registration
pages, user forms have resulted in more personal information being available than before.
Organizations like the Census Bureau, insurance companies, hospitals, universities keep
databases that contain valuable information about an individual.
A large body of literature in computer security describes research in access control,
which is a model that describes who has access to what. Access control is built upon
appropriate authentication. While it is important to protect our sensitive database from
improper access, we are interested in a related problem. Database managers who have
appropriate authorization may inadvertantly release some statistical information which
is thought to be sanitized, or harmless to privacy but from which one can recover some
sensitive information. The problem of privacy in such databases is to protect information
specific to an individual while releasing aggregate data for research purposes.
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1.1

Statistical databases

A statistical database is a database where the data is collected with the purpose of releasing
aggregate statistical information, or allowing certain types of queries to retrieve relevant
statistical information. The major difference between a statistical database and a typical
database is its limited querying interface. Querying is typically limited to operations such
as count, sum and mean. The central issue in statistical databases is to provide accurate
and reliable aggregates of data while preventing the disclosure of individual information.
While researchers with good intentions should be able to get the statistical information
about the database, a malicious user may be able to craft a series of queries that allows
the recovery of specific field values. In [7] the authors show that a mischievous researcher
can calculate the value of any query, so long as the statistical database’s minimum query
N
size is set no higher than k =
where k is the minimum query size and N is the size of
6
the database.

1.2

Privacy preserving approaches

The following approaches are used to maintain privacy in statistical databases.
Query restriction Here, we only allow a restricted set of queries. This set is carefully
selected so that private information cannot be recovered. Typical restrictions include
query set size control, where answers to queries are not provided if the set on which
the statistics is based is smaller than some prespecified threshold. Another way is to
only allow queries with predetermined range. For example, statistics on population
age groups are only provided for ages 0-10, 10-20 and so on.
Data perturbation Some noise is added to the database. The challenge is to preserve
statistical properties of the original database. For example, if we add to a field noise
that follows a normal distribution with zero mean, then the mean is not expected to
change and the variance will increase in a predictable way.
Output perturbation Some noise is added to answers to queries. It is important that
the noise depends on the query only, so that the result is the same whenever the
same query is answered.
Query monitoring In this method, queries are monitored to ensure that it is not possible
to recover sensitive information even with answers to previous queries. This method
is usually computationally intensive, as the general problem of deciding if some
sensitive information can be recovered from a set of answers is NP-complete. In
addition, there is a potential for a denial of service attack, because the more queries
are answered, the fewer new queries can be allowed to preserve privacy.
Cell Suppression In this approach, data is published in tables where each table entry
is called a cell. All cells that might cause confidential information to be disclosed
(for example when it is derived from only a few individuals) are suppressed. Other
cells of non confidential information that might lead to a disclosure of confidential
information also have to suppressed (complementary suppression). In [6] a thorough study on cell suppression is presented and shows that cell suppression becomes
impractical if an arbitrary complex syntax for queries is allowed.
2

2

Background

Denning’s book [6] contains a chapter on protecting privacy. The treatment is quite
extensive, but follow-up research on the topics covered has been meager. More recently
(about year 2000) the database community started investigating privacy-preserving data
mining. Publications in this area define privacy in many different ways, and many don’t
even provide a formal definition. Definitions typically describe whether privacy is preserved
or not. In our research, we want to measure privacy loss, not just state if privacy loss
occurred or not.
In [2] the authors use a measure of privacy as follows. If the original value of a field
can be estimated with c% confidence to lie in the interval [α1 , α2 ], then the interval width
(α2 − α1 ) defines the amount of privacy at c% confidence level. For example, with data
perturbation, if the added noise is uniformly distributed in an interval of width 2α, then
α is the amount of privacy at confidence level 50% and 2α is the amount of privacy at
confidence level 100%. This can be explained by the following example.
Consider an attribute X with the density function

fX (x) =



 0.5 0 ≤ x ≤ 1

0.5 4 ≤ x ≤ 5
otherwise


 0

Assume that the added noise Y is distributed uniformly between [−1, 1]. Then according to the measure proposed, the amount of privacy is 2 at confidence level 100%.
Let a large amount of data be available, so that the distribution function is revealed to a
high degree of accuracy. Since the perturbing additive is publicly known, the two pieces
of information can be combined to determine that if Z ∈ [−1, 2], then X ∈ [0, 1]; whereas
if Z ∈ [3, 6] then X ∈ [4, 5].
Thus, in each case the value of X can be localized to an interval of length 1. This means
that the actual amount of privacy offered by the perturbing additive Y is at most 1 at
confidence level 100%. This method suffers from the fact that a reconstruction algorithm
provides a certain amount of knowledge that can be used to guess a data value to a higher
level of accuracy.
In [1] the authors present a measure to quantify information loss. Given the perturbed
values z1 , z2 , ..., zn , it is not possible to reconstruct the original density function fX (x)
with an arbitrary precision. The greater the variance of the perturbation, the lower the
precision in estimating fX (x). The lack of precision in estimating fX (x) is referred to as
information loss. Let fˆX (x) denote the density function of X as estimated by a reconstruction algorithm. The following metric has been proposed to measure the information
loss incurred by a reconstruction algorithm in estimating fX (x):
1
I(fX , fˆX ) = E
2

Z

fX (x) − fˆX (x) dx



ωX

The proposed metric equals half the expected value of L1 − norm between the original
distribution fX (x) and its estimate fˆX (x). The information loss I(fX , fˆX ) lies between 0
and 1; I(fX , fˆX ) = 0 implies perfect reconstruction of fX (x) and I(fX , fˆX ) = 1 implies
that there is no overlap between fX (x) and its estimate fˆX (x). The proposed metric
3

is universal in the sense that it can be applied to any reconstruction algorithm since it
depends only on the original density fX (x) and its estimate fˆX (x).
In [8] a notion of non-privacy is presented – a situation which should not be allowed
in any reasonable database setting. The authors call a database non-private if a computationally bounded adversary can expose a 1−ε fraction of the database entries for all ε > 0.
In other words, non-privacy excludes even very weak notions of privacy. The authors then
proceed to give a definition of privacy with respect to a bounded adversary with no prior
knowledge. They denote the content of a statistical database by (d1 , . . . , dn ) ∈ {0, 1}n . A
query q ⊆ [n] is answered by A(q). Their definition of privacy is based on the fact that
an adversary should not be able to predict the i th bit, regardless of the content of the
rest of the database. The database-adversary is modelled as a game that consists of two
phases. In the first phase, the adversary queries the database (adaptively). At the end of
this phase, the adversary outputs an index i, of the private function πi (d1 , . . . , dn ) = di it
intends to guess. In the second phase, the adversary is given the query-response transcript
of the first phase plus all but the i th database entries, and outputs a guess. Privacy is
preserved if the adversary fails to guess di with high probability.
We like a recent definition ([4]) of privacy loss based on the intuition that privacy is
protected when one blends in the crowd. In a nutshell, if an adversary succeeds to produce
an approximation of a database record much better than without the statistical release,
then privacy is compromised. The authors compare different sanitization techniques using
their definition.
Sometimes, compromising privacy is acceptable, provided only a little bit of privacy is
lost. We would like to provide a measure of privacy loss. With such a measure, one would
be able to not only state that privacy loss occurred, but also state to what extent privacy
has been lost. For example, we would like to be able to say the 10 bits of privacy was lost,
or that 10% privacy was lost.
Our measure definitions are theoretical and based on information theory. Although
our definitions provide a formal measure of privacy loss, it is a stretch to imagine these
definitions can be used in practice. Because the measure depends on on the probability
distribution for the database and on the outside available knowledge, it is impractical to
compute the privacy loss, given a database and a potential statistical release. The main
purpose is to provides a uniform setting in which to compare different privacy preserving
methods and algorithms.
Some recent work of two of the authors [11] uses a different approach for measuring
privacy loss. The motivating example is as follows. If someone’s blood pressure can be
approximated as a result of a statistical release, a health insurance company may decide
to increase the insurance rates for that person. The privacy loss is based on how much
potential financial loss could occur to an individual as a result of the statistical release.
This paper is an overview of the results from the Master’s thesis [5] of the first author,
under the supervision of the second and third author. We have included here only the
main definition and a few results from the thesis. For a more elaborate coverage and a
number of examples and figures, look for the thesis at http://digitalcommons.utep.edu/.
A number of our results were also announced at the SCISS05 workshop [12].
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Defining privacy

Let’s consider the case where all the information in the database is sensitive. The other
case, when some data is more sensitive than other, is open for further investigations. Since
we want to base our measure on information theory, a natural way is to use Kolmogorov
complexity.

3.1

Kolmogorov complexity as a measure of information

The Kolmogorov complexity, K(x) of a string x is the length of the shortest binary program
to compute x on a universal computer. Intuitively, K(x) represents the minimal amount of
information required to generate x by any effective process [10] [14] [3]. The Kolmogorov
complexity of a string can be viewed as an absolute and objective quantification of the
amount of information in it. The conditional Kolmogorov complexity K(x|y) of x relative
to y is defined similarly as the length of the shortest program to compute x if y is furnished
as an auxiliary input to the computation.
Kolmogorov complexity is a measure of quantity of information. Suppose the Kolmogorov complexity of a record in the database is 2000 bits. A statistical release that
would provide some information about this record would allow us to recover the record
with fewer than 2000 bits. This means that the Kolmogorov complexity decreases when we
consider the conditional Kolmogorov complexity relative to the statistical release. Intuitively, the privacy loss is proportional to how much the complexity of the record decreases
relative to the statistical release. However, consider a database containing the salaries of
employees for a company. Suppose someone has a salary which is exactly the average salary
of all employees. In this case, according to the naive definition, the statistical release will
compromise the privacy of this record almost totally. This is against our intuitive notion
of privacy loss. There may be a small privacy loss, but this is really acceptable. Since
Kolmogorov complexity does not segregate information, if a released salary average happens to be someone’s social security number, the Kolmogorov complexity based definition
would consider it a total loss of privacy.

3.2

Defining privacy using entropy

The problem with Kolmogorov complexity is that the information contained in the release
may be coincidentally the same as some of the records, but the uncertainty of this fact
makes it irrelevant. This means we need to base our definition on probability distributions.
An information source is a mathematical model for a physical entity that produces a
succession of symbols. Shannon [13] associated information with the unpredictability of a
symbol. The information measure I(p) should satisfy the following properties
• Information is a non-negative quantity: I(p) ≥ 0.
• If an event has probability 1, we get no information from the occurrence of the event:
I(1) = 0.
• If two independent events occur, then the information we get from observing the
events is the sum of the two information: I(p1 · p2 ) = I(p1 ) + I(p2 ).
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• The information measure should be a continuous and monotonic function of the
probability p.
This leads us to the following measure of information
I(p) = − logb (p)

(1)

for some positive constant b, where p is the probability associated with the occurrence of an
event. As we can see the formula mentioned above satisfies the basic notions of information
which are non-negativity, additivity of information when two independent events occur,
continuity and zero information gain when the probability of an event occurring is one.
The different bases for the logarithm used in 1 lead to different units for our information
measure. When b = 2, the information measure is bits while b = 10 results in digits. We
use bits as the unit for measuring information as it seems more intuitive in our approach.
Now, let us assume we have a set of events E = (e1 , e2 , . . . , en ) and a set of probabilities
(probability distribution) associated with each event P = (p1 , p2 , . . . , pn ). Shannon defined
the entropy of the probability distribution by
H(P ) =

n
X

pi . log(1/pi )

(2)

i=1

3.3

Defining privacy loss

In order to define privacy, we must fix a suitable model to represent our database. The
data in many application domains, for example, medical records, financial transactions
or employee data, can be represented as data tables. A data table can be seen as a
simplification of a relational database, since the latter in general consists of a number of
data tables. A formal definition of a database is given below
Definition 1 A database is a triple D = (R, A, Va |a ∈ A) such that
• R is a nonempty finite set of records
• A is a nonempty finite set of attributes, and
• every attribute a ∈ A is a total function a : R → Va , where Va is the set of values of
a, called the domain of a.
For example, consider a database consisting of 100 records with the following attributes
age, sex and salary. Then, for the database D we have
• R = {r1 , r2 , . . . , rn }.
• A = {a1 , a2 , a3 }, where a1 , a2 , a3 imply age, sex and salary repectively.
• Va1 = {0, 1, . . . , 150}.
Va2 = {M, F }.
Va3 = {0, 100, . . . , 10000}.
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Consider the scenario where the database is generated using a random source. The
database is assumed to have a fixed number of records n. Let R = {r1 , r2 , . . . rn } be the set
of records associated with a database and V = {v1 , v2 , . . . vk } be the values associated with
a record for an attribute a ∈ A. Let D = {d1 , d2 , . . . dq } be the set of possible databases
with each di ∈ D having a probability qi .
We associate successive observations of possible values of a record ri with a random
variable Xi . Let the probability mass associated with the value vx is pi i.e
P (Xi = vx ) = pix , where

k
X

pix = 1

x=1

Therefore, the information associated with the outcome
Xi = vx is − lg(pix ).
We calculate the entropy of an individual record as
k
X

H (Xi ) = −

pix lg(pix ).

(3)

x=1

where H (Xi ) is the entropy of the ith record in the database for an attribute a ∈ A.
Let S be any statistics released about the database. After observing S, we can rule
out all the possible databases di that are inconsistent with S. This reduction in the set
of possible databases results in a change in qi ’s associated with a database. To maintain
P
consistency, the qi ’s are adjusted accordingly such that
qi = 1. Let the new possible
set of databases be D0 . This reduction in the set of possible databases corresponds to a
change in the probability mass associated with the value vx for a record ri . We get,
P (Xi = vx ) = qi · |tx |, = p0ix
where tx is the set of records ri in D0 that has value vx .
Hence, the entropy of a record after the statistical release is given by
H 0 (Xi ) = −

k
X

p0ix lg(p0ix ).

x=1

H (Xi ) − H 0 (Xi ) gives the loss of information for record ri in the database. Similarly we
can compute the loss of information for every record in the database. We now formally
define privacy loss as follows:
Definition 2 Let H(X1 ), H(X2 ), · · · , H(Xn ) be the entropies associated with each record
in the database and H 0 (X1 ), H 0 (X2 ), · · · , H 0 (Xn ) be the entropies associated with the records
after a statistical release. We define privacy loss as the maximum loss of information associated with a record in the database given by,
PrivacyLoss(P) = max H (Xi ) − H 0 (Xi )



i≤n
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For a given statistical release, our definition relates privacy loss to the maximum loss
of information associated with a record in the database. We further illustrate this concept
using the example below
Consider a one dimensional database consisting of 3 salaries. A salary in the database
may take values from the following set V = {100, 200, 300}. We assume that the records
in the database are randomly generated resulting in a uniform distribution of the salaries.
The user queries the database for its average. We consider two cases:
Case a: Let the result of the query be 200. We need to determine the privacy loss
associated with this release.
Prior to the statistical release, the entropy of a record in the database is given by
H(Xi ) = −

3
X

pi · lg(pi ), where pi =

i=1

1
3

= 1.585bits
The possible set of databases prior to releasing the average was k n where k is the
number of values that a record can take and n is the number of records. Therefore, the
possible set of databases D = 27.
After releasing the average, we can ignore all databases where the average is not 200.
This narrows the set of possible databases to only 7 of them.
Calculations for this new set of possible databases lead to an entropy of 1.439 bits.
Since, the entropies for all the records are equal, the loss of information associated with
each record is the same. From 2 the privacy loss after releasing the average is 1.585 −
1.439 = 0.146 bits.
The reason for a small loss of information in this example is because the average
returned by the query reflects the statistical mean for the three salaries in the database
following a uniform distribution.
Case b - Let the result of the query be 100.
From the previous case, we know that the entropy of a record prior to the statistical
release is 1.585 bits. Because for this case there is only one possible database with an
average of 100, the entropy after the statistical release is 0. The loss of information is
1.585 − 0 = 1.585 bits indicating total privacy loss which supports our intuition of exact
compromise.

3.4

Application to binary databases

The simplest case to analyse is that of a binary database, a database where every attribute has a value in {0, 1}. The following results apply to binary databases. Proofs and
illustrative graphs are found in [5].
Theorem 1 Let D be a 1-D binary database consisting of n records. We assume that
each record in the database is generated independantly and randomly. Each value 0 or 1
occurs with equal probability. Let S be a statistical release that releases the average of the
data in the database. Then, the privacy loss is given by


Privacy Loss P(Xi ) = max 1 −
i≤n



k
n
lg
n
k
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+

n−k
n
lg
n
n−k






(4)

where, k is the sum of the data in the database.
Theorem 2 Let D be a 1-D database consisting of n records. We assume that the
database is generated randomly, where each value 0 or 1 occurs with equal probability.
Let S be a statistical release that releases the average of the data in the database and
P(X) be the privacy loss due to S. Then, the expected privacy loss is given by
Expected privacy loss =

n
X
1
k=0

2n

n
k

!



1−

n
k
lg
n
k

 



−

n−k
n
lg
n
n−k






(5)

where k is the sum of the salaries in a database.
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Remaining problems and future work

There are still some problems with our definition. Consider a release which publishes
the whole database after it has been encrypted with a public key. Because our definition
is based in classical entropy, it does not consider computation time in the encoding of
information. In a secure cryptosystem, computing the secret key from the public key
is intractable. But theoretically, the secret key is computable from the public key. So,
according to our definition, there is a total loss of privacy in this case. It is however
generally accepted that encrypted data is useless without the decrypting key, so in this
case we should conclude that the privacy has been protected.
To solve this problem, we need to consider effective entropy. This is a version of
entropy that takes into consideration the time to compute the coding and decoding of the
information. The first definition and use of this concept was by Yao [15].
Another avenue of research is to consider the concept that not all bits of equally
sensitive. For example, discovering the first two bits of someone’s salary or blood pressure
may be considered much worse than discovering the last two bits. The different approach
described in [11] is a way to address this problem.
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